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Abstract: On the 60th Anniversary of the storied Hart-
Fuller Debate, we would like to briefly revisit it to highlight 
some of its concerns and discussions in order to demons-
trate how vivid they still are and may serve as a path to the 
Rule of Law, concluding on the importance of promoting 
fruitful argumentation on essential issues in Jurisprudence 
to enlighten the practice of Law.
Keywords: Hart-Fuller debate; Philosophy of Law; morali-
ty; positivism; rule of law.
Resumen: Con ocasión del sesenta aniversario del im-
portante debate Hart-Fuller, volvemos a él para destacar 
algunos de sus principales aspectos buscando mostrar su 
actualidad y su capacidad de servir para la consolidación del 
Estado de Derecho. Concluimos enfatizando la importancia 
para iluminar la práctica jurídica de fomentar discusiones fe-
cundas en cuestiones esenciales de la Filosofía del Derecho.
Palabras clave: debate Hart-Fuller; Filosofía del Derecho; 
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1. intRoduction
Out of the ‘witches’ cauldron’? 
Nicola Lacey
J ust over sixty years ago, Harvard Law School provided the scenario for a debate between two influential legal theorists from the anglo-saxon world, which turned to be the so called «Hart-Fuller Debate» 1.
Lon Fuller, Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard, invited Her-
bert Hart, Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and «holder of England’s 
most prestigious position in Legal Philosophy» 2 at that time, to give the Law 
School’s Annual Holmes Lecture. Professor Hart took the opportunity to 
enunciate his emerging theory of positivism –not exactly formalist–, though 
invited by Fuller, who, in his turn, was «not infrequently accused of stirring 
1 lacey, N., «Out of the Witches Cauldron? Reinterpreting the Context and Reassessing the 
Significance of the Hart-Fuller Debate», in P. Cane (ed.), The Hart-Fuller Debate in the Twen-
ty-First Century, Hart-Publishing, , Oxford. 2011, p. 1.
2 «(...) but with only a handful of articles though», in ibid., p. 5-6.
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the «witches’cauldron’ of irracionalist natural law theory 3». That year at Har-
vard changed Hart’s life, «in the stimulating publishing-oriented atmosphere 
of a top American law school 4»and projected him to become a significant the-
orist in the Jurisprudence world.
On the other side, Lon Fuller, the unforgettable author of «The Case of 
Speluncean Explorers 5» – and not exactly a «nice new englander with some 
quite original ideas 6», as Hart once expressed –, was born in Texas and had a 
very special concern on decision making processes since his childhood 7. He 
studied Economics and Law; had a strong social scientific perception, and was 
a self taught in Philosophy and Anthropology 8. During his life time, he has 
been an arbitrator – what he would refer to as «solving problems» more than 
«dispute resolutions» – and actively engaged in institution-building 9. Since 
1926 he headed straight to academic life and from 1948 to his retirement in 
1972, he held the Carter Chair (formerly Roscoe Pound) at Harvard Law 
School 10 with a special involvement in ensuring adequate materials for the 
study of Jurisprudence 11». Fuller was a popular teacher, «vigorous yet kind-
ly 12». As Griswold put: «He set high standards, but terror was never an ele-
ment in his method» 13. Indeed, he was perplexed with Hart’s exposition, for 
secular Natural Law was the basis of his own theory, since «his deep interest 
in the significance of institutions was not a separate agenda, but rather found 
consistent expression in his explicitly jurisprudential work» 14.
Their exchange has been published in the Harvard Law Review in 1958 
and the legacy, departing from the concerns raised after the II World War 
on the validity of legal systems, are still enlightening Philosophy of Law to 
understand the role of forms and content in making a Rule of Law possible 
3 lacey, N., 2011, p. 1.
4 Ibid., p. 6.
5 Ibid., p. 13.
6 Ibid., p. 11.
7 FulleR, L., «Irrigation and Tiranny», Stanford Law Review, 17 (1965), p. 1021-2.
8 «(...) slip into metaphysics by the back door» in FulleR, L., «The Principles of Social Order» in 
K. Winston (ed.), Selected essays of Lon Fuller, Hart Publishing, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, 
USA, 2001, p. 327.
9 lacey, N., 2011, p. 10.
10 Ibidem. 
11 Ibid., p. 11.
12 Ibidem. 
13 Ibidem.
14 Ibid., p. 15.
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departing from the discussion of the separability of law and morality, namely, 
affirming the power of Law itself, stripped of moral normative sense, and the 
problems it does generate when legal language is emptied of a reasonable cri-
terion based on anthropological evidences.
Therefore, although we intend to briefly present both positions with fi-
delity to the ideas conveyed in and from the debate, we also target to honor 
Fuller, for the coherence of his thought and concern on legal education, so 
that future lawyers and judges could really become instruments of justice. In 
fact, through his writings, gathered in the last chapter of «The Principles of 
Social Order» edited by Kenneth Winston 15 and named «Legal Philosophy, 
Legal Education and The Practice of Law», he demonstrated how essential is 
helping Law students to reflect, promoting a productive thinking and a solid 
legal education towards a fair and just practice of Law.
2. the haRt – FulleR deBate
His argument is better than his. 
Leo Strauss 16
The exchange between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart was chosen to be the 
central theme of a colloquium held at the Australian National University in 
2008, celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the debate 17. In 2011, Peter Cane re-
united and published the presentations. Some important Jurisprudence scholars 
such as Jeremy Waldron, Kristen Rundle, Gerald Postema, along with others, 
revisited and reinterpreted the argumentation. As Nicola Lacey stated in this 
publication: even a search in internet, would show Hart’s Concept of Law with 
91.000 against Fuller’s Morality of Law with 49.000 18. Thus, rethinking the de-
bate happened to be an opportunity to give the proper recognition to each po-
sition, which only the passage of time can define and prove.
15 FulleR, L., 2001.
16 Refering to Fuller’s in the debate. suMMeRs, R., Lon L. Fuller, Stanford University, Stanford, 
1984, p. 4.
17 cane, P. (ed.), The Hart-Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century, Hart-Publishing, Oxford, 
2011, Preface.
18 lacey, N., 2011, p. 2.
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The main discussion departing from Hart’s Lecture at Harvard was the 
separation of law and morals. This question was raised by the possibility of 
Nazi law being qualified as such, namely, a legal system, based on the enacted 
statutes and a rule of recognition, so called by Hart as an imperative command 
formally legitimated, since in his perspective, legal rights and moral rights 
are not related. In fact, in 1951, a german woman was convicted of illegally 
depriving her husband from freedom, although she argued she had not perpe-
trated a crime while acting according with the law of her country at that time.
Hart’s sophisticated theory on legal positivism within the framework of 
analytic Philosophy, was launched right there, during his lecture, although it 
was only the beginning of a broader chain of ideas and consequences. Linguis-
tic arose as a special tool to interpret law, combined with the jurisprudential 
tradition to solve cases that go beyond the core – cases covered by the statutes 
– and reach what Hart labeled penumbra. On the other hand, he also tried 
to balance obedience to Law – departing from John Austin’s theory, with a 
sort of acceptance based on the rule of recognition, and not only in coercion, 
since he rejected Kelsen’s positivism – although influenced by him –, mainly 
on sanctions. In Hart’s view, this obedience would not be founded in the idea 
of justice or morality. In his proposal, he offers a distinction between primary 
and secondary rules, where those govern conduct, while the second allow cre-
ation, modification or extinction of primary rules through the rule of recogni-
tion. In this regard, there are two perspectives: the external aspect, namely, the 
tendency of observance of rules with regularity, and the internal point of view, 
which provide the critical reflective attitude. The normative quality of law 
will depend precisely in this turning point. But, all things considered, Hart’s 
argues that the question of what is Law must be separated from the question 
of whether it is moral or just. What matters is the Law as it is, and not as it 
should be, and the legal system as functioning effectively, though neither just 
or moral. Its content would not be a question for the Law.
In this sense, Law’s validity is independent and the legislator’s role is 
peripheral and insert in a more complex structure. In fact, primary rules, op-
erated by officials entrusted by secondary rules, will have to be guided by 
the rule of recognition which is the criteria of the validity of law. Therefore, 
a legal system would be the union of primary and secondary rules, with the 
endorsement of the rule of recognition.
On the other side of the debate, Fuller firmly sustained that law and moral-
ity could not be so neat distinguished and that calling the Nazi system «legal» 
and its rules «law» was a false description of what they were in fact, namely, in-
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struments of an arbitrary and tyrannical regime. Thus, he tried to demonstrate 
through his named «inner morality» that Law is not a neutral concept and must 
be founded in some moral procedural requirements 19 such as clarity, non-retro-
activity, publicity, generality, reciprocity, etc., respecting human agency and its 
constitutive freedom. Therefore, Law would motivate human conduct through 
rational purposes and promote communication, initiative and responsibility to-
wards the social order as a corollary. As Professor Rundle affirmed, based on 
Fuller’s assumption that to be a legal subject is not merely to be a member of a 
subservient populace ready to do what they are told to do 20:
For Fuller, there can be no meaningful concept of law that does not in-
clude a meaningful limitation of the lawgiver’s power in favor of the agency 
of the legal subject. 21
Besides, while fighting Hart’s «rule of recognition», Fuller underlines its 
incapacity of being a mirror of people’s acceptance, since Hitler completely 
manipulated Nazi law, identifying it with his own dominatrix will and incon-
sistent with the constitutional system, as well. Indeed, for Fuller, Law not only 
should protect the agency but presupposes it in its origin 22. In his viewpoint, 
the essential issue of Nazi law would not be the atrocities committed through 
its commands, but mainly because formerly, its procedure did not treat peo-
ple – Jews! – as free and responsible. Thus, Fuller wanted to denote that the 
binding power of Law doesn’t come from the strength of the significance of its 
words but from its inner morality 23, where we also find reciprocity in applying 
and obeying the Law. Hence, if at that time Nazi law had been previously 
submitted to the eight desiderata required through the procedural morality of 
Law, the damaging content would never have been able to survive 24.
Let us see how Fuller presents his statements.
19 Rundle, K., «The impossibility of an exterminatory legality: law and the holocaust», in Univer-
sity of Toronto Law Journal, n. 59 (2009).
20 Undated and untitled document. The papers of Lon L. Fuller, Harvard Law School Library, Box 
12, Folder 1 (notes for «Reply to Critics»).
21 Rundle, K., Forms Liberate. Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon Fuller, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2012, p. 2.
22 RosleR, A., You can not go grossly morally wrong with Law. Can you? Draft for Jurisprudence, Buenos 
Aires, 2012, p. 6.
23 MaRtins, A. V. G. da S., A moralidade do Direito como Condição de Liberdade em Lon Fuller, 2ª ed., 
Lex/Magister, Porto Alegre, 2017, p. 117.
24 Ibid., p. 118.
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3. FoRM, suBstance and the Rule oF laW
Forms liberate 
  Fuller
Maybe a dream come true for some positivists would be simply oppose 
form to substance in Law and decide cases literally. In fact, the core of the 
Hart-Fuller Debate is form against moral content. Positivism tends to formal-
ism, although Hart is aware of the limits of language 25, chiefly in hard cases. 
In this sense, he opposes the noble dream – «for every conceivable case there 
is some solution which is already law before he decides the case and which 
awaits its discovery» 26 – and the nightmare, where the decisions depend on 
the political and economic moment and are performed by judges, as we find 
in American realism. Considering his double perspective, Hart prefers to be 
attached to norms then to judges.
On the other hand, Fuller tries to demonstrate how form and substance 
can coexist harmonically, through rational and reasonable purposes, capable 
of «subjecting the human conduct to the governance of rules 27, when protect-
ed by an internal procedural morality expressed in eight desiderata 28:
1. Generality: implies primarily the establishment of rules – «there must 
be rules» – departing from rational patterns (reasoned generality) and direct-
ed to all citizens in general without distinction, also avoiding ad hoc decisions 
and securing the neutrality of courts 29. This desideratum guarantees the unity 
and integrity of the system, protecting it from casuism as well.
2. Promulgation: the rules must be known through their publication – 
though its legality doesn’t depend simply on it – so that citizens can orient and 
calculate the consequences of their conduct 30. The publicity also helps not to 
evoke the ignorance of the Law.
25 tavaRes, A. R.; osMo, C., «Interpretação Jurídica em Hart e Kelsen: Uma postura (Anti) Re-
alista?», in Teoria do Direito Neoconstitucional ou Reconstrução do Positivismo Jurídico, Método, São 
Paulo, 2008, p. 131.
26 Ibid., p. 137 et seq.
27 FulleR, L., The Morality of Law, Fawcett, New York, 1964, p. 110.
28 Ibid., p. 59 et seq.
29 FulleR, L., «A Reply to critics», in The Morality of LawYale University, New Haven, 1969, 
p. 109.
30 Ibid., p. 51.
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3. Prospectivity: rules must not be retroactive. In fact, to direct today’s behav-
ior with laws edited tomorrow is an empty act. It is not simply a bad Law. It is not 
Law at all 31. Overrule would be an exemption and always in a helpful and positive 
way 32. This desideratum has a deep connection with the problem of due process 
of law, mainly in Criminal Law, as accepted by the Nazi State, what proves its 
anti-juridicity. For Fuller, prospectivity is not only an aspiration of perfection but 
a clear way to avoid and recognize the most obvious indecencies 33.
4. Clarity: The responsibilities involved in the demand must be clear. 
This is one of the most desired ingredients of juridicity. We should not express 
Law in an unintelligible way: an obscured legislation turns legality untenable 
and demands continuous revisions, undermining the legal system 34.
5. Consistency: laws can’t demand contradictory actions. Lack of coher-
ence within the legal system and incompatibilities – things that not go togeth-
er or not go together well – must be avoided 35.
6. Possibility: laws can’t require the impossible or unreasonable. This re-
quirement is rooted in an intern principle of obedience, drafting guidelines to 
human efforts – not superhuman – and avoiding exploration, manipulation, 
pernicious acts, etc. 36
7. Constancy: rules must remain relatively stable through time. Law 
changes should not be frequent. Its inconstancy would certainly cause prob-
lems with retroactivity 37. Thus, in Professor Luis Fernando Barzotto’s words, 
Law can accomplish its function as an instrument not of transformation but 
of social preservation 38.
8. Congruence: there must be compliance and harmony between official 
action and declared rules. This desideratum promotes reciprocity, which is cru-
cial for a healthy legal system. It is hard to obey something that are is not 
obeyed by the person responsible for the command. In some way, trust on the 
system is based in this requirement 39. On the other hand, congruence relies 
31 Ibid., p. 53.
32 Ibid., p. 57.
33 Ibid., p. 62.
34 Ibid., p. 63.
35 Ibid., p. 69.
36 Ibid., p. 77.
37 Ibid., p. 79-80.
38 Class at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande dos Sul, Law School, Porto Alegre, Brazil, No-
vember, 2011.
39 FulleR, L., 1969, p. 52.
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on the right interpretation of Law, which respects its intention and purpose 40 
in a detached way in order to correctly apply it 41.
In fact, these moral procedural requirements respect form and content 
of Law as well:
Some identify his theory with the skeleton of the rule of law. The «ori-
ginalists» fulfilled the body with constitutional content. But in Fuller’s case, 
the analogy would refer to the health of the organism, stating that it would 
be easier to heal a flu through the procedural morality than a cancer perver-
ting the whole system, through a discussion on substance, allowing judges 
to decide beyond Law. Robert Summers expresses the bound between form 
and the rule of law: Fuller attested the important relation between dedica-
tedly pursuing procedural purposes in a determined system and the quality 
of the substantive objectives achieved. Specifically, in his point of view, a 
healthy Rule of Law generates a sound, or at least harmless substantive law, 
or, as Fuller synthetizes: If we do things the right way, we are likely to do 
the right thing 42
Within his theory, Fuller corroborates that a Rule of Law can’t be re-
duced to norms literally interpreted through its purpose and applied, its legal-
ity supposed. He demonstrates that there is a pattern of moral commitment 
– though procedural, in fact, anthropological and secular – that sustains it by 
respecting human nature as:
a) rational – citizens should be guided by the purpose of the Law for a 
«wholehearted and understanding acceptance» 43;
b) relational – the goal of the Law is to secure good social and economic 
relations (workable arrangements) in the Community (shared com-
mitment) 44;
40 Private intentions are irrelevant: «Speaking of the Statute of Frauds, Lord Nottingham Said in Ash 
v. Abdy, 3 Swanston 664 (1678), «I had some reason to know the meaning of this law; for it had its first 
rise from me.». Cf. «If Lord Nottingham drew it, he was the less qualified to construe it, the author of an 
act considering more what he privately intended than the meaning he has expressed». Campbell’s Lives of 
the Lord Chancellors of England, 3 (3rd ed., 1848), 423 in FulleR, L., 1969, p. 86.
41 (...) not according to judges’s fantasies (...) but with the totality of the legal system. In FulleR, L., 1969, 
p. 82.
42 MaRtins, A. V. G. da S., «Fundamentos Procedimentais do Estado Democrático de Direito em 
Lon Fuller», Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latino-Americano, año XX (2014), p. 697.
43 Winston, K., 2001, p. 6.
44 FulleR, L., «Eunomics: The Theory of Good Order and Workable Social Arrangements», in 
Winston, K., 2001, p. 61 and seq. and 82 et seq.
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c) free – the human being has a constitutive right to self-direction, in a 
positive way  45 and Law should promote it;
d) responsible – not only in facing the consequences of their choices, but 
also in the sense of carrying about the development of society 46.
As a matter of fact, Fuller brings good News to Jurisprudence. Betting 
on nature, without overestimating it, but taking it as it is – the way things are 47 
– he connected realism, not through skepticism towards rules or men, but in 
an optimistic style 48, conceiving Law as a collective project of citizens, where 
«affinities between legal rules and informal social expectations must close» 49. 
That is why Hitler’s commandments were so repulsive to Fuller.
Indeed, if the eight requirements, based on Fuller’s anthropological con-
ception, could have judged Nazi Law in its very beginning, we would never 
have gotten to its disastrous and anti-human consequences. But in some way, 
the debate remains.
4. the deBate in the 21st centuRy
The plan was to identify themes that lay on or below the surface 
of the debate and to rethink them in the light of social, 
political and intellectual developments in the past 50 years. 
Peter Cane 50
A deep debate in Jurisprudence may always be a light for the future: «a 
point of departure and inspiration 51». Among other discussions on this signif-
icant debate, we found the effort of Peter Cane in gathering different topics 
rooted in its assumptions, such as Human Rights, International Criminal Law, 
Pluralism, Normative Social Behavior, Legal Reasoning and Law making, 
Law and Politics, Instrumentalism, etc.
This specific study is a sample of how Philosophy of Law goes back and 
forth, deepening the legal thought not only with historical interest but as a 
45 Winston, K., 2001, p. 19; 318-319;321, 323-28, etc.
46 Ibid., p. 207 et seq.
47 FulleR, L., The Anatomy of Law. Wetsport: Greenwood, 1987, p. 53.
48 Ibid., On Teaching Law. Cambridge: Harvard Law School Repository, 1950, p. 39.
49 Ibidem.
50 cane, P., 2011, Preface.
51 Ibidem.
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«springboard», through lens which can view further to enlighten new issues 
and contexts, with tangible conclusions for the practice of Law, as Cane states:
In my opinion, they demonstrate that this debate between two of the 
twentieth century’s greatest legal theorists continues to present a rich, and 
by no means exhausted, seam of jurisprudential ideas waiting to be mined in 
the years to come. 52
In fact, the debate brought out lights, for instance, to implement an In-
ternational Procedural Right; to the importance of global visibility in Law; 
to detailed issues on the Rule of Law applied; on concrete adjudication and 
relationship between systems; on deep questions on interpretation; on the ra-
tionality of commitments and even to honesty as a basis for justice. Indeed, 
Fuller’s inner Morality – mainly configured through the debate – disclosed 
the problems of positivism and American realism, offering a solution that can 
make Law possible 53 and promoting positive citizen’s interaction through the 
accomplishment of «my word is my bound 54» in both sides, as well.
Even though the debate has served as a source of reflection to many ar-
eas, we would like to focus on a specific issue, departing from what we name 
– mainly in Latin America-, neoconstitutionalism. The Rule of Law scheduled 
in the eight requirements has been the topic of some conferences in a past few 
years, since almost none of them are respected in the populist regimes estab-
lished in this continent, where the worst sample would be Venezuela.
We also quote the experience of Brazil, where Fuller’s theory was brought 
in books and papers 55 to reflect on the steps to the Rule of Law. Indeed, the 
country is hardly and slowly heading to the so desired «Estado Democráti-
co de Direito», with the impeachment of a President, the «Operação Lava 
Jato» against corruption and the prison of another popular president recently 
convicted. The desiderata could show the entangled confusion between the 
52 Ibidem.
53 FulleR, L., 1964, p.46 et seq.
54 Pettit, P. «How Norms Become Normative», in cane, P., 2011, p. 246.
55 jaRdiM, F., Teoria Interacionista do Direito: PL 7448/2017 merece ser sancionado, <https://www.
jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/artigos/teoria-interacionista-do-direito-23042018>, April 24, 2018 
(visited May 3, 2018); costa, M.; e MaRtins, I. G., A importância do Direito de Defesa para a 
democracia e a cidadania, OAB, São Paulo, 2018. MaRtins, A. V. G. da S., «Fundamentos do 
Estado Democrático», in Folha de São Paulo (August 25, 2018); and id., «Racionalidade Jurídica 
à moda da Casa», in O Estado de São Paulo (May 1, 2018).
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Executive, Legislative and Judiciary powers – a vaccum of congruence –; lack 
of generality in applying rules with selectivity; ignorance cultivated through 
ideology in collusion with media; attempts to apply laws in a retroactive way; 
lack of proportionality and arbitrariness in penalizing – or not – convicted 
politicians; systemic inconsistency and incoherence in adjudication and chiefly 
a complete lack of correspondence to the citizen’s legal expectations based in 
an anti-ethical behavior due to political interests.
As we can see, even in a crisis, the inner morality can help to figure out 
how to overcome it, still being a light to guide scholars and operators of Law. 
Indeed, an important legacy of the Hart-Fuller Debate.
5. conclusion
They exchanged views about plans for the wider 
dissemination of jurisprudential ideas 
 in forms accessible to students. 
Nicola Lacey
This brief essay was presented during a very interesting and fruitful Sem-
inar held at the University of Navarre in January 2018 on «The Future of 
Philosophy of Law». In fact, it endorsed our conclusion towards a reflection 
on the importance of promoting productive thinking in academic life so that 
Law students can go beyond in the role they will play as «architects of social 
structures 56», as Fuller called Law operators:
In sketching this idea of mission, Fuller opposes what he calls the liti-
gational conception of a lawyer’s competence currently dominant in legal 
education. According to this conception, which was a major legacy of legal 
realism, a lawyer’s expertise lies in the ability to predict and influence the 
exercise of state power, especially in courtrooms. Law professors contribu-
te to the development of this expertise by making students knowledgeable 
about the behavior patterns of judges. But Fuller rejects this conception, 
primarily because it turns lawyers into masters of technique without regard 
to the ends they serve 57.
56 FulleR, L., 2001, p. 285.
57 Winston, K., 2001.
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Indeed, Fuller had a special concern in legal education and a real inter-
est in his students, aiming to be not a «wet blanket», but a «spark plug» by 
fostering a «training appropriate to their vocation 58. This was the goal of the 
Holmes Lecture which originated the Hart-Fuller Debate: give them a deeper 
sense, not only methods and techniques; face reasons and whys and ask for the 
nature of legal problems to think like lawyers 59 in order to contribute to the 
efficient attainment of social goals and human improvement.
The Hart-Fuller Debate is a treasure of Jurisprudence, from where our 
needy century, thirsty of justice, keeps on bringing out its jewels to light. May 
we also promote healthy discussions based on deep study to prepare new in-
struments of justice – our pupils – to be able to build a fairer society. As Fuller 
stated, «injustices are made with elbows not with wrists 60».
58 Ibid., p. 294.
59 FulleR, L., 1950, p. 37 and 41.
60 Winston, K. «Legislators and Liberty», Law and Philosphy, v. 13, n. 3 (1994), p. 394-395.
